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Abstract
Two federal statutes have unwittingly resulted in depriv-
ing nonresident United States citizens of a constitutional 
right to bear arms. This article considers the background 
of the statutes, the rights and obligations of US Citizens 
abroad, and past jurisprudence on the Second Amend-
ment. Through analysis of two types of scrutiny, one can 
consider how far to take the right to bear arms and de-
termine how the right to bear arms should be treated for 
those who consciously give up permanent residency and 
live abroad. 
Keywords: Second Amendment; non-resident citizens; 
right to bear arms; Dearth vs. Lynch; US Constitution. 
Resumo
Duas normas federais têm involuntariamente resultar em 
privar cidadãos norte-americanos não residentes no país 
do direito constitucional de portar armas. Este artigo con-
sidera o plano de fundo dessas normas, os direitos e obriga-
ções dos cidadãos americanos no exterior e a jurisprudên-
cia existente sobre a Segunda Emenda. Através dessa aná-
lise, pode-se considerar o quão longe deve-se levar o direito 
de portar armas e, também, determinar como o direito de 
portar armas deve ser tratado para aqueles que consciente-
mente desistem de manter residência permanente nos EUA 
e decidem viver no exterior.
Palavras-chave: Segunda Emenda; cidadãos norte-ameri-
canos não residentes no país; direito de portar armas; De-
arth vs Lynch; Constituição dos Estados Unidos da América.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The combined power of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(9) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3) makes it 
illegal for a nonresident U.S. citizen to purchase or rent a firearm for self-defense pur-
poses. Although the statutes were not specifically aimed at nonresident U.S. citizens, 
the result is a Congressional decision to eliminate nonresident U.S. citizens’ Second 
Amendment rights in favor of giving state gun regulations more bite. A statutory ban 
on citizens purchasing firearms outside of their “state of residence” has placed nonresi-
dent U.S. citizens outside of the scope of Second Amendment protections. These laws 
are being challenged in Dearth v. Lynch by a plaintiff who is a U.S. citizen residing in 
Canada. He claims that his Second Amendment rights are being infringed by these stat-
utes and consequently, that these statutes are unconstitutional. 
This article first explores how nonresident U.S. citizen’s Second Amendment 
rights are affected by the statutes. The statutory language and background are ex-
amined to show how the rights of nonresident U.S. citizens have been defined in the 
context of firearms purchases. Next, the article examines legal rights and obligations 
of nonresident U.S. citizens abroad. This serves to show that the Second Amendment 
rights should not be restricted simply because someone loses residence status in the 
United States. Then the paper will analyze Second Amendment jurisprudence. The 
analysis first considers the language of the Second Amendment, the historical jurispru-
dence, and the new paradigm established by District of Columbia v. Heller and subse-
quent cases. After explaining the precedent on Second Amendment issues, the article 
will provide an overview of the case in question, Dearth v. Lynch, by presenting the 
case’s facts and procedural posture, and then outlining the 2-step approach the D.C. 
Circuit uses to analyze Second Amendment challenges. Finally the paper will conclude 
with an application of the 2-step approach to the facts of the case and an analysis of 
what the potential outcomes could be in the case. 
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2. THE STATUTES IN QUESTION
2.1. The Statutory language 
The two statutes in question address both the individual attempting to pur-
chase a firearm and the person/entity attempting to sell a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(9), 
which addresses the purchaser, reads as follows: “It shall be unlawful – for any person, 
other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed col-
lector, who does not reside in any State to receive any firearms unless such receipt is 
for lawful sporting purposes.”1 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3), which addresses the seller, reads as 
follows: “It shall be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed 
dealer, or licensed collector to sell or deliver – any firearm to any person in any state 
who the licensee knows or has reasonable cause to believe does not reside… in the 
State in which the licensee’s place of business is located, except that this paragraph… 
shall not apply to the loan or rental of a firearm to any person for temporary use for 
lawful sporting purposes.”2
2.2. Background of the enactment 
The two main policy considerations behind the statues in question are prevent-
ing criminals from circumventing state firearm regulations and preventing internation-
al firearm trafficking.3 As a supplement to state firearm regulations, the statutes werea 
result of a multi-year investigation into violent crimes. The investigation produced evi-
dence that criminals were traveling across State borders to purchase firearms in States 
that had less stringent gun control laws than the criminals’ resident States.4 The crimi-
nals would then bring the purchased firearms back into their resident State, resulting in 
the criminal circumventing their resident state’s firearm regulations entirely.5 Congress 
believed that this left the states powerless to regulate the types of firearms transported 
1  18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(9).
2  18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3).
3  See Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d 59, 62-63 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2204: “Section 
922(b)(3)…It is also designed to prevent the avoidance of State and local laws controlling firearms other than 
rifles and shotguns by simple expediency of crossing a State line to purchase one. There is no comparable 
provision in the present Federal Firearms Act.”
4  See Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d at p. 62-63; see also S. Rep. No. 89-1866, at p. 19 (1966): “The serious prob-
lem of individuals going across State lines to procure firearms which they could not lawfully obtain or possess 
in their own State and without the knowledge of their local authorities.”
5  See Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d at p. 62-63. 
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into their jurisdiction.6 This problem was particularly concerning when considering eas-
ily concealable handguns.7
To combat this growing problem, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control 
Act. Congress determined that federal control over interstate and foreign commerce in 
firearms was needed.8 Thus, Congress passed the two statutes in question to strength-
en the States’ abilities to regulate firearms crossing into their borders.9 The combined 
power of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(9) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3) legally restricted residents to 
only purchasing guns within their resident state and legally restricted gun sellers to 
only selling guns to people who resided in the state in which their business was lo-
cated. However, these laws resulted in the unintended consequence of restricting non-
resident U.S. Citizens from purchasing guns in any state. 
2.3. Definition of non-resident in the context of acquiring a firearm 
A nonresident U.S. citizen is a person who has U.S. citizenship but does not have 
a state of residence. The combination of 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 and ATF Ruling 2010-6 de-
fines what a person’s “state of residence” is for the purpose of acquiring a firearm under 
the Gun Control Act of 1968. 
27 C.F.R. § 478.11 defines a “state of residence” as the following: “The State in 
which an individual resides. An individual resides in a State if he or she is present in a 
State with the intention of making a home in that State.”10 The regulation continues to 
provide four examples that illustrate what a “state of residence” is. Example 1 provides 
that “A maintains a home in State X. A travels to State Y on a hunting, fishing, business, 
or other type of trip. A does not become a resident of State Y by reason of such trip.”11 
Example 2 is not applicable to the subject of this paper.12 Example 3 provides that “A, an 
alien, travels to the United States on a three-week vacation to State X. A does not have 
6  Idem. See also Pub.L. No. 90–351, Title IV, § 901(a)(5), 82, p. 225: “The sale or other disposition of concealable 
weapons… to non-residents of the State in which the licenssess’ places of business are located, has tended to 
make ineffective the laws, regulations, and ordinances in the several States and local jurisdictions regarding 
such firearms.”
7  See Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d at p. 62-63.
8  Idem. See also Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title IV, § 901(a)(3), 82 Stat. p.. 225: “That only through adequate federal 
control over interState and foreign commerce in these weapons, and over all persons engaging in the business 
of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in them, can this grave problem be dealt with, and effective State and 
local regulation of this traffic be made possible.”
9  See Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d at p. 62-63.
10  27 C.F.R. § 478.11.
11  Idem. 
12  Example 2 provides that “A maintains a home in State X and a home in State Y. A resides in State X except 
for weekends or the summer months of the year and in State Y for the weekends or the summer months of 
the year. During the time that A actually resides in State X, A is a resident of State X, and during the time that A 
actually resides in State Y, A is a resident of State Y.” 
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a state of residence in State X because A does not have the intention of making a home 
in State X while on vacation. This is true regardless of the length of the vacation.”13 An 
alien14 is defined “as any person not a citizen or national of the United States.”15 Example 
4 provides that “A, an alien, travels to the United States to work for three years in State X. 
A rents a home in State X, moves his personal possessions into the home, and his family 
resides with him in the home. A intends to reside in State X during the 3-year period of 
his employment. A is a resident of State X.”16 
ATF ruling 2010-6 states that 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 defines a person’s “state of 
residence.”17 The ATF ruling has two holdings. The first holding is as follows: “a United 
States citizen who temporarily resides in a foreign country, but who also demonstrates 
the intention of making a home in a particular State, is a resident of the State during the 
time period he or she actually resides in that State.”18 The second holding specifies how 
a person can demonstrate intent to make a home in a state: “the intention of making 
a home in a State must be demonstrated to a Federal firearms licensee by presenting 
valid identification documents. Such documents include, but are not limited to, driver’s 
licenses, voter registration, tax records, or vehicle registration.”19 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 de-
fines an “identification document” as “a document containing the name, residence ad-
dress, date of birth, and photograph of the holder and which was made or issued by or 
under the authority of the United States Government… which, when completed with 
information concerning a particular individual, is of a type intended or commonly ac-
cepted for the purpose of identification of individuals.”20 
The ATF ruling also provides what are not sufficient conditions for establishing 
a “state of residence.” Ownership of a home or land within a state is not sufficient to 
establish a “state of residence,” nor is it necessary to establish a presence and intent to 
make a home in a state.21 Also, temporary travel, which the ATF ruling defines as short-
term stays, vacations, or other transient acts in a state, are not sufficient to establish 
a “state of residence” because short-term stays do not demonstrate intent to make a 
home in the state.22  
13  Idem.
14  United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015). (holding that a noncitizen with substantial 
connections to the United States enjoyed Second Amendment Rights.
15  Idem. 
16  Idem.
17  At Fruling 2010-6 at p. 1. 
18  Idem. at p. 3.
19  Idem.
20  Idem. at p. 2.
21  Idem.
22  Idem.
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2.4. The Second Amendment rights of non-resident U.S. citizens 
The combined power of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(9) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3) makes it 
illegal for a U.S. Citizen who does not have a state of residence to purchase a firearm 
for any purpose while visiting the United States.23 Furthermore, these two statues also 
prohibit nonresident U.S. citizens from renting a firearm for self-defense purposes.
ATF regulations require a purchaser of a firearm over-the-counter to fill out Form 
4473 completely.24 Question 13 of Form 4473 asks the purchaser to provide his/her 
state of residence.25 In this context, an individual resides in a State “if he or she is pres-
ent in a State with the intention of making a home in that State.”26 Thus, a nonresident 
U.S. Citizen cannot provide an answer to this question. Consequently, the transaction 
is terminated.27 
3. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF NON-RESIDENT U.S. CITIZENS 
BEYOND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Although nonresident U.S. citizens reside outside of the United States, they are 
still provided with legal rights and obligations when they travel abroad and when they 
return to the United States, however briefly. 
One of the legal rights a nonresident U.S. citizen enjoys even though they re-
side abroad is the right to vote in federal elections.28  In 1986, Congress passed the 
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act. The act granted nonresident 
U.S. citizen the right to cast an absentee ballot in federal elections.29 Nonresident U.S. 
citizens can cast a ballot in the last place they were domiciled before leaving the United 
States.30 However, a nonresident U.S. citizen who never received domicile in any state 
could not cast a vote in a U.S. election. 
Though Congress has not acted affirmatively on issues of other rights, one can 
presume they exist by default. If one can vote, then one can engage in the speech 
23  See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(9); 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3).
24  27 C.F.R. § 478.124(a): “A licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer shall not sell… any 
firearm to any person, other than another licensee, unless the licensee records the transaction on a firearms 
transaction record, Form 4473.”
25  See Form 4473: Firearms Transaction Record Part I – Over-the-Counter.
26  See idem.
27  See Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d 59, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
28  See 52 U.S.C. § 20303; 52 U.S.C. § 20310(5)(B).
29  See 52 U.S.C. § 20303; 52 U.S.C. § 20310(5)(B).
30  52 U.S.C. § 20310(5)(B).
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associated with such a vote. The freedom to practice religion or entitlement to due 
process is not waived for lack of residency.31 
In addition to the rights of a nonresident Citizen, the federal government has the 
power to tax nonresident U.S. citizens anywhere in the world.32 Regardless of whether 
a taxpayer gains income and/or resides abroad, the U.S. government can legally collect 
taxes on its citizens’ economic gains anywhere in the world.33 The Supreme Court case 
Cook v. Tait established this precedent. In Cook, the Court held that the government 
has the power to levy a tax on any U.S. citizen worldwide because U.S. citizens and 
their property receive a benefit from the U.S. government by just being a citizen. Thus, 
U.S. citizens have an obligation to pay for this benefit by filing federal income returns 
whether they reside in the U.S. or abroad.34 
Lastly is the obligation for males to register for the selective service. The selec-
tive service is a method of recalling male citizens for service in time of war.35 All male 
citizens, age eighteen and over, are required to register, regardless of residency, disabil-
ity, religion, or dual citizenship.36 Failure to register can result in loss of educational aid, 
federal job prospects, and can result in punitive measures and/or jail time, depending 
on the circumstance.37 There is no listed exception for nonresident US Citizens. 
4. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND AMENDMENT
4.1. The Second Amendment’s language: the prefatory clause and 
the operating clause
The natural starting point of an analysis of what protections are afforded under 
the Second Amendment is the Second Amendment’s language itself. It is commonly 
known that the Second Amendment grants U.S. Citizens the right to bear arms. Indeed 
31  There is clearly an exception to due process requirements for US Citizens living abroad and engaging in acts 
of war against the United States. TAYLOR, Adam. The U.S. keeps killing Americans in drone strikes, mostly by ac-
cident. Washington Post, Apr. 23, 2015. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/
wp/2015/04/23/the-u-s-keeps-killing-americans-in-drone-strikes-mostly-by-accident/>.
32  See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924). 
33  See idem. “The basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the 
property in all cases, it being out of the United States… and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of 
the citizen, that being in or out of the United States.” 
34  See idem. “The principle was declared that the government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his 
property wherever found, and therefore has the power to make the benefit complete.”
35  Selective Service System, About, https://www.sss.gov/About.
36  Selective Service System, Who Must Register, https://www.sss.gov/Registration-Info/Who-Registration.
37  Selective Service System, Why Register, https://www.sss.gov/Registration/Why-Register/Benefits-and-Pen-
alties.
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the language of the Second Amendment itself surely expresses this notion explicitly: 
“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”38 
However, the aforementioned quote is only part of the Second Amendment. 
The language that immediately precedes the aforementioned quote, which less people 
are familiar with, reads as follows: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the secu-
rity of a free State.”39 Thus, the Second Amendment, in its entirety, provides that “a well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”40 
The reason for pointing out this distinction is that the central issue of Second 
Amendment interpretation and analysis has revolved around the meaning and interac-
tion of these two parts. The first part of the Second Amendment, i.e., “a well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,”41 is the prefatory or justification 
clause, while the second part of the Second Amendment, i.e., “the right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,”42 is the operative clause.43 The accepted 
interpretation of these two clauses is that the prefatory clause states the purpose of 
the operative clause.44 Thus, one could recast the Second Amendment’s language by 
phrasing it as follows: the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be in-
fringed because a well-regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free state.45
4.2. Second Amendment interpretations
Three competing interpretations of the Second Amendment have found sup-
porters both in the courts and in academia: the individual right model; the collective 
right model; and the narrow individual right model.46 
38  U.S. Constitution. Second Amendment.




43  See DC v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008): “The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its 
prefatory clause and its operative clause.”; see also VOLOKH, Eugene. The Commonplace Second Amendment. 
New York University Law Review, New York, vol. 73, n. 3, p. 793-821, jun. 1998: “The Second Amendment is 
widely seen as quite unusual, because it has a justification clause as well as an operative clause.)
44  See DC v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 577: “Its prefatory clause and its operative clause. The former does not limit the 
latter grammatically, but rather announces a purpose.”; see also VOLOKH, Eugene. The Commonplace Second 
Amendment. New York University Law Review, New York, vol. 73, n. 3, p. 793-821, jun. 1998: “The Second 
Amendment, unusually for constitutional provisions, contains a Statement of purpose as well as a guarantee 
of a right to bear arms”.
45  See DC v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 577: “The Amendment could be rephrased, “Because a well regulated Militia is 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.”
46  FROMAN Sandra S.; KLUKOWSKI Kenneth A. A Round in the Chamber: District of Columbia v. Heller and the 
Future of the Second Amendment. The Journal of the Federalist Society Practice Groups, Washington, vol. 
9, n. 1, p. 16-21, feb. 2008. 
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The individual right model contends that the Second Amendment grants law 
abiding adult citizens the individual right to have firearms for any lawful purpose. The 
individual right is derived from natural law and English Common law, promoting the 
belief that the Second Amendment was created to protect individuals’ fundamental 
right to personal protection through the use of firearms. Advocates of this model also 
point out that the Second Amendment acts as a final check against governmental tyr-
anny by allowing the people to rebel against the government if necessary.
The individual right model has two alternative arguments that interpret the Sec-
ond Amendment differently. One argument is that when the constitution was written, 
the militia was composed of every able-bodied young adult male, and modern federal 
law defines “militia” the same way. Thus, the individual right was granted to non-mili-
tary and military personnel alike. The other argument is that the Second Amendment’s 
prefatory clause announces a non-exclusive purpose for the individual’s right to bear 
arms, but does not weaken the effect of the operative clause.
The collective right model claims that the purpose of the Second Amendment is 
to provide for an armed military force, while not disregarding the Founding Fathers’ ap-
prehension for standing armies. According to this model, the Second Amendment does 
not grant any individual rights to the people to bear arms.  Rather, proponents of this 
model believe that the Second Amendment was enacted to prevent the government 
from passing laws that would interfere with the States’ ability to raise armed militias. 
This model has lost persuasive value because its premise that the Second Amendment 
did not grant any individual rights has increasingly come under attack. Instead of fight-
ing an uphill battle, gun control advocates turned to a third interpretive model. 
The narrow individual rights model argues that the Second Amendment grants 
individuals the right to bear arms for the sole purpose of keeping citizens equipped 
with enough firearms to allow the government to call up a state militia if necessary. 
Thus, this model asserts that the Second Amendment grants individual rights to people 
who are serving in a state militia, i.e., the National Guard. This theory, like the less-popu-
lar collective right model, relies on the language of the Second Amendment’s prefatory 
clause. Proponents believe that “militia” refers to military units and that “well regulated” 
refers to government-controlled units. Supporters of this model believe that the Sec-
ond Amendment’s operative clause grants the people the right to bear arms only to the 
extent that those arms can be used if the government needs to raise an armed militia. 
4.3. The modern approach under Heller
Justice Scalia, an ardent textualist, examined the meaning, relationship, and im-
plications of the two parts of the Second Amendment in the landmark case District 
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of Columbia v. Heller.47 In Heller, the Court sought out to resolve the issue of whether 
Washington D.C.’s prohibition on the possession of usable handguns both inside and 
outside the home violated the Second Amendment.48 To resolve this issue, the Court 
decided how the prefatory and operative clause interacted with each other in order to 
determine what the scope of the Second Amendment protection is. 
Herein lies the controversy, if the prefatory clause states the purpose of the op-
erative clause, then it appears reasonable to conclude that an individual’s right to bear 
arms should not be narrower or broader than the purpose of maintaining a well-reg-
ulated Militia. Adopting this conclusion would lead to the inference that the people’s 
right to bear arms is protected up to the point that it curtails the government’s ability 
to maintain a well-regulated militia and not up to the point that it curtails the people’s 
ability to defend themselves with the use of firearms. However, in Heller, the Court did 
not adopt this line of reasoning. Rather, the Court held that the fundamental or core 
interest protected by the Second Amendment is the right of the people to use arms 
for self-defense within their homes.49 Justice Scalia wrote in the Heller opinion that the 
prefatory clause states the purpose of the operative clause and does not grammatically 
limit the operative clause.50 
The Court ultimately ruled that the Washington D.C. prohibition on handguns 
was unconstitutional,51 holding that the Second Amendment, at the very least, confers 
law-abiding citizens with the right to keep and bear non-dangerous arms for self-de-
fense in their homes.52 The Court reasoned that the fundamental or core interest pro-
tected by the Second Amendment is the right to use arms for self-defense within one’s 
home.53 There are two reasons why this holding is so important in Second Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
First, prior to Heller, the only Supreme Court Case to rule on what the Second 
Amendment meant was the Supreme Court’s 1939 ruling in United States v. Miller54.55 
47  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
48  See idem. at p. 573. 
49  See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010), citing D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008).
50  D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 578: “But apart from that clarifying function, a prefatory clause does not lmit or 
expand the scope of the operative clause.”
51  Idem. at p. 635.
52  See idem. at p. 628-29: “Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated consti-
tutional rights, banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection 
of one’s home and family would fail constitutional muster.”
53  See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010), citing D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008).
54  307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
55  FROMAN Sandra S.; KLUKOWSKI Kenneth A. A Round in the Chamber: District of Columbia v. Heller and the 
Future of the Second Amendment. The Journal of the Federalist Society Practice Groups, Washington, vol. 
9, n. 1, p. 16-21, feb. 2008: “The only precedent dealing with the meaning of the Second Amendment in depth 
is United States v. Miller.”
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Prior to the National Firearms Act of 1934, the Federal Government passed very few gun 
control laws.56 It was not until the public unrest and political assassinations in the Viet-
nam War era that the federal government started to pass more gun control regulations. 
However, as the federal government passed more gun control laws in the 1970’s, Sec-
ond Amendment jurisprudence was largely underdeveloped because, as mentioned 
before, the Supreme Court only ruled on the meaning of the Second Amendment once 
in Miller. The increase in federal gun control laws passed by Congress increased the 
amount of Second Amendment challenges, but the Supreme Court did not grant cer-
tiorari on these cases until Heller.
Second, the Court’s holding in Heller, i.e., the fundamental interest protected by 
the Second Amendment is the right of the people to use arms for self-defense within 
their homes, appears to go against the holding in Miller. In Miller, the court examined 
the constitutionality of the National Firearms Act.57 The defendants were charged with 
violating the National Firearms Act because they were caught transporting an unregis-
tered short-barrel shotgun between states. Defendants challenged the law on Second 
Amendment grounds.58 The Court ruled that the National Firearms Act did not violate 
the Defendants’ Second Amendment rights.59 The Court reasoned that the purpose of 
the Second Amendment was to assure Congress’ power to maintain a well-regulated 
Militia.60 The Court ruled that the short barrel shotgun did not serve the purpose of 
preserving the government’s ability to maintain a well-regulated militia.61 Thus, the Na-
tional Firearms Act did not infringe upon the defendants’ Second Amendment rights 
because it fell outside the stated purpose of the Second Amendment.62 
The Miller court seemed to be adopting either a collective right model or a nar-
row individual right interpretation of the Second Amendment, while the Heller court 
was unquestionably adopting an individual right model interpretation of the Second 
Amendment. The language and reasoning of Miller is more in line with the collective 
right model and narrow individual right model because it heavily relies on the prefatory 
56  See idem. at p. 16
57  See U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. at p. 175.
58  See idem. at p. 176: “Defendants also challenged the law on separation of powers ground, challenging the 
federal government infringement upon the State’s police power, which the Court held was untenable”.
59  See idem. at p. 183.
60  See idem. at p. 178: “The Constitution as originally adopted granted to the Congress power- To provide for 
calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union… With obvious purpose to assure the continuation 
and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment 
were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”
61  See idem: “Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equip-
ment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.”
62  See idem: “In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a shotgun having a 
barrel of less than eighteen inches in length at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation 
or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to 
keep and bear such an instrument.”
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clause to rule out the possibility that the defendants’ Second Amendment rights were 
violated. However, the holding in Miller does not preclude the existence of an individual 
right granted by the Second Amendment like the collective right model wholly rejects 
and the narrow individual right model limits. Adding to the controversy is the occur-
rence of some circuit courts, albeit prior to Heller, adopting Miller’s reasoning when 
confronted with Second Amendment challenges.63 
5. THE CASE AND CONTROVERSY: DEARTH V. LYNCH
5.1. Procedural Posture 
Dearth v. Lynch is the fourth chapter in the case between Plaintiffs, Steven 
Dearth and the Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., and Defendant, the U.S. Govern-
ment. In 2009, plaintiffs filed a claim against the government in the United States Dis-
trict Court of Columbia that challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(9), 18 
U.S.C. § 922(b)(3), and related regulations as-applied to Mr. Dearth and people similarly 
situated to him.64 Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Declara-
tory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202.65 The government motioned to dismiss the 
claim for lack of standing.66 The district court granted the government’s motion, and 
the plaintiffs appealed the ruling to the D.C. Circuit Court. 
On appeal,67 the D.C. Circuit Court held that Mr. Dearth had standing.68 How-
ever, the court did not reach the issue of whether the Second Amendment Foundation 
had standing because it did not raise any issues that were not already raised by Mr. 
Dearth.69 Consequently, the circuit court reversed the district court’s judgment and re-
manded the case to the district court for further proceedings.70
Following the Circuit Court remanding the case back to the district court, plain-
tiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on all 6 counts of their complaint.71 Plaintiffs 
challenged 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(9), 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3), and 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.29a, 478.96, 
63  See VOLOKH, Eugene. The Commonplace Second Amendment. New York University Law Review, New 
York, vol. 73, n. 3, p. 793-821, jun. 1998:  “See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding 
that right only extends to situations where a particular person's arms ownership “preserve[s] or insure[s] the 
effectiveness of the militia”
64  See Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d 59, 59, 64-65 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 500 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). 
65  Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d at p. 64.
66  See Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d at p. 65; Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d at p. 500.
67  Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d at p. 54; 64-65 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
68  Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d at p. 503-04.
69  See Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d at p. 4; Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d at p. 503.
70  See Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d at p. 504.
71  See Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d at p. 64.
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478.99, 478.124 on three different grounds: the statutes and regulations violated plain-
tiffs’ Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms because the statute and its regu-
lations place limitations upon the receipt and use of firearms to U.S. citizens who do 
not claim residency in any state; the statutes and regulations violated plaintiffs’ rights 
to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment because they are being discriminated 
against on account of residency and cannot exercise their Second Amendment rights; 
the statutes and regulations infringe upon plaintiffs’ liberty interest in international 
travel, which is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.72 De-
fendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and alternatively, a motion for 
summary judgment.73 The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(9), 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3), and 
their implementing regulations did not violate Mr. Dearth’s Second Amendment rights, 
did not deprive him of his Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law, 
and did not violate Dearth’s rights to international travel under the Fifth Amendment.74 
Ultimately, the court granted summary judgement in favor of the government on all 
six counts.
Once again the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s ruling to the circuit court.75 
The circuit court ruled that the record was not developed enough to uphold the sum-
mary judgment motion.76 The court reasoned that the record needed to be more devel-
oped because the case represented such an important question77 and the record raised 
too many unanswered questions about the plaintiff’s situation. Thus, the circuit court 
vacated the district court’s entering of summary judgment in favor of the government, 
and it remanded the case to the district court for trial.78
5.2. Facts
Plaintiff Stephen Dearth is an American citizen who resides in Canada. Mr. 
Dearth does not have a residence in the United States. Also, he is over the age of 21, 
does not have a criminal record, and has a valid Utah permit to publicly carry a hand-
gun. Plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. is a non-profit membership organi-
zation that focuses on education, research, publication, and legal actions regarding the 
Second Amendment’s right to bear arms. 
72  See idem. at p. 65-66.
73  See idem. at p. 64.
74   See idem. at p. 74-75.
75  Dearth v. Lynch, 791 F.3d 32 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
76  See idem. at p. 34.
77  See idem., citing to Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249,256-57 (1948).
78  See idem. at p. 35.
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In 2006 and 2007, while in the United States, Mr. Dearth attempted to purchase 
firearms. However, he was denied both times because he could not provide an answer 
to Question 13 of Form 4473, which asks for the buyer to provide his/her “state of resi-
dence.” Both transactions were terminated because Mr. Dearth does not reside within a 
state in the United States. Mr. Dearth alleged that he intends to lawfully purchase fire-
arms in the United States for sporting and self-defense purposes. He plans on storing 
the firearms with his relatives in Ohio.79
5.3. Two-step approach to evaluate the constitutionality of a law 
when challenged on Second Amendment grounds 
The D.C. Circuit, like other circuits,80 adopted a two-step approach to analyze Sec-
ond Amendment challenges.81 The first inquiry is whether the challenged provision(s) 
impinges upon a right protected by the Second Amendment. This inquiry inevitably 
raises the question of what protections are afforded under the Second Amendment. 
To answer this question, courts must look to the landmark case D.C. v. Heller, 
which was discussed in depth above, for guidance.82 The Court held that the funda-
mental or core interest protected by the Second Amendment is the right to use firearms 
for self-defense within one’s home.83 The Court also held that the Second Amendment, 
like the First Amendment, is not unlimited in its scope.84 However, these two holdings 
left much of the Second Amendment’s scope undefined.85
Nonetheless, the Court provided some clarity on the limits of the Second Amend-
ment by concluding that Heller did not cast doubt on longstanding gun regulations.86 
79  See Dearth v. Holder, 893 F.Supp.2d at p. 64.
80  See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d at p. 684; 701-04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d at 
p. 673; 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, at p. 800-01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at p. 85; 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
81  See Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1244; 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
82  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
83  See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at p. 85; 97 (3d Cir. 2010), citing D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 570; 629 
(2008).
84  See idem. at p. 595: “The Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course 
the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not. Thus, we do not read 
the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we 
do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”
85  See idem. at p. 626: “We do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the 
Second Amendment.”
86  Idem. at p. 626-27: “Nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensi-
tive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.”
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The Court held that longstanding gun regulations are “presumptively lawful.”87  Some 
circuits have latched onto this small piece of definitiveness from the Heller opinion.88 
The D.C. Circuit justified the presumption that a longstanding regulation is constitu-
tional by reasoning that a long duration of acceptance demonstrates that the pub-
lic has accepted the regulation and that it does not burden a constitutional right.89 
However, a plaintiff may rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the challenged 
regulation has more than a de minimis effect upon his/her right. The converse of this 
relatively bright-line rule is that newer regulations are not “presumptively lawful.”
Without the Supreme Court taking a definitive stance on the scope of the Sec-
ond Amendment, the circuits remain split on whether and to what extent the Second 
Amendment affords protection outside the home.90 The Seventh Circuit held that the 
Second Amendment’s right to bear arms for self-defense has the same importance 
both inside and outside the home.91 Whereas the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits 
held that the Second Amendment protections are more limited outside the home.92 
If a court determines that the challenged regulation impinges upon a citizen’s 
Second Amendment rights, the court will proceed to the second step of the analysis. 
During the second step of the analysis, the court determines whether the challenged 
provision(s) passes muster under the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.93 
The level of constitutional scrutiny depends on the nature of the conduct being 
regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.94 Thus, a reg-
ulation that imposes a substantial burden upon the core right of self-defense protected 
by the Second Amendment must have a strong justification, and in contrast, a regula-
tion that imposes a less substantial burden should be proportionately easier to justify. 
87  Idem. at p. 26: “We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does 
not purport to be exhaustive.”
88  See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d at p. 185; 195-
96 (5th Cir. 2012); Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1244; 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
89  Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1253.
90  See Dearth v. Lynch, 791 F.3d at p. 32; 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
91  See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d at p. 933: “The Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a 
right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.”
92  See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d at p. 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013): “if the Second Amendment protects the right to 
carry a handgun outside the home for self-defense at all, that right is not part of the core of the Amendment.”; 
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d at p. 81; 96 (2nd Cir. 2012): “Because our tradition so clearly indi-
cates a substantial role for State regulation of the carrying of firearms in public, we conclude that intermediate 
scrutiny is appropriate.”; U.S. v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at p. 458; 470 (4th Cir. 2011): “We assume that any law 
that would burden the fundamental, core right of self-defense in the home by a law-abiding citizen would be 
subject to strict scrutiny. But, as we move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, 
because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.”
93  See Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1244; 1252. 
94  Idem. at p. 1257, quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d at p. 673; 682 (4th Cir. 2010).
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Depending upon the challenged law and the right impinged upon, the court may apply 
intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny, but not a rational basis test.95
Intermediate scrutiny requires that a regulation promotes an “important” or 
“substantial” government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the 
regulation.96 The regulation cannot be substantially broader than necessary to achieve 
the government interest.97 Additionally, the relationship between the regulation and 
the government interest needs to only be reasonable and not perfect.98 This level of 
scrutiny is far less stringent than strict scrutiny. 
The court will chose to use intermediate scrutiny over strict scrutiny when the 
challenged regulation impinges upon any other right protected by the Second Amend-
ment that is not the core protection of self-defense.99 As stated above, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Heller that the fundamental or core interest protected by the Second 
Amendment is the right to use arms for self-defense within one’s home.100 Thus, when 
a challenged regulation impinges upon an interest protected by the Second Amend-
ment that is not the right to use arms for self-defense within one’s home, the court 
will choose to examine the regulation using intermediate scrutiny as opposed to strict 
scrutiny.101 
When applying strict scrutiny, the court determines whether the law is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.102 If the court is applying strict 
scrutiny and a less restrictive alternative would advance the government’s interest, 
then the legislature must use the less restrictive alternative.103 
An example of the court applying strict scrutiny to a regulation is the Heller 
case.104 As mentioned prior, the challenged regulation presented to the Supreme Court 
prohibited individuals from keeping handguns both inside and outside their home.105 
The court ruled that this type of law would not pass any type of scrutiny because it 
impinged upon the core and fundamental protection of the Second Amendment.106 
95  See idem. at p. 1256.
96  See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at p. 781; 782-83 (1989); Dearth v. Lynch, 791 F.3d at p. 32; 44 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015); Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1244; 1258.
97  See idem. 
98  See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at p. 85; 97-98 (3d Cir. 2010).
99  Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1244;1257.
100  See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at p. 97, citing D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008).
101  See idem. at p. 96.
102  See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at p. 85, n. 14 (3d Cir. 2010), citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at p. 803; 813 (2000).
103  Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d at p. 426; 436 (3d Cir. 2013), quoting Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at p. 813.
104  D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. at. p. 570; 628-29 (2008).
105  See idem. at p. 573.
106  See idem. at p. 628-29. 
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Even though the right to bear arms is an enumerated fundamental constitution-
al right, courts have the discretion to not apply strict scrutiny to Second Amendment 
challenges.107 The court applies strict scrutiny only when the challenged statute bur-
dens the core protection of the Second Amendment, i.e., the right to use fire arms for 
self-defense within one’s home.108 The court follows the same principle for First Amend-
ment challenges to content-based restrictions on speech in a public forum, i.e., the core 
protection of the First Amendment. 
The rational basis test presumes the law is valid and asks only whether the stat-
ute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.109 However, courts cannot chose 
to apply a rational basis test to a Second Amendment challenge.110 The Supreme Court 
ruled out this option in the Heller case.111 The Court reasoned that if all that was re-
quired to overcome an enumerated right was a rational basis test, then the Second 
Amendment would have no effect and would be redundant with the separate constitu-
tional prohibitions on irrational laws.
6. APPLYING PRECEDENT TO THE STATUTES
Analysis of the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(9), 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3), 
and related regulations will be organized within the framework of the two-step ap-
proach for analyzing Second Amendment challenges. First the statutes and regulations 
are examined for how they affect the right protected by the Second Amendment. Then 
the level of scrutiny is examined. Based on that level of scrutiny, the court will analyse 
whether the statutes and regulations can stand. 
6.1. The potential effect of the Statutes being longstanding gun reg-
ulations and therefore presumptively lawful
To determine whether a statute impinges upon a right protected by the Sec-
ond Amendment, one must start by examining whether the challenged statutes are 
longstanding. As mentioned in a prior section, the Seventh Circuit presumes that stat-
utes that are longstanding are presumptively lawful.112 In Heller, the Supreme Court 
gave a non-exhaustive list of longstanding restrictions that qualify as longstanding 
107  See Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1256, citing to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at p. 781; 791 (1989); 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at p. 96; U.S. v. Chester, 628 F.3d at p. 673; 682 (4th Cir. 2010).
108  See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d at p. 436; Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1256; United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
at p. 96.
109  See US v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at p. 95 n. 13; D.C.  v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 629 n. 27.
110  See US v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at p. 95-96.
111  See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 629 n. 27.
112  D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 570, FN. 26 (2008).
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prohibitions, which the decision was not meant to cast doubt on.113 One of these long-
standing prohibitions was the “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.”114
The defendant in this case has demonstrated that there is a longstanding histo-
ry of gun laws prohibiting nonresidents from purchasing guns.  Defendant has pointed 
out that since the early 20th century, 12 states and the District of Columbia have enacted 
restrictions on the purchase and acquisition of firearms by nonresidents.115 Although 
the historical restrictions on nonresident firearm purchases do not exactly replicate 
922(a)(9) and 922(b)(3), multiple courts have ruled that the challenged law’s historical 
origins do not have to be “carbon copies” of the current statutes being challenged.116 
Furthermore, the examples of longstanding gun control laws in the Heller opin-
ion makes it more reasonable to conclude that 922(a)(9) and 922(b)(3) should be con-
sidered longstanding for two reasons. First, the Heller court uses “laws imposing condi-
tions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms”117 as an example of a long-
standing gun control law that the opinion was not meant to cast doubt on. It is pretty 
clear that 922(a)(9) and 922(b)(3) fall into this category. Second, the other two examples 
the Heller Court uses for longstanding gun controls, i.e., felony firearm ban and mental 
illness felony ban, trace their history back to the mid-1950’s.118 These bans are very-well 
established, even though they have only been law for about the last sixty years. Thus, 
gun bans on nonresidents tracing back to the early 1900’s appears to be longstanding, 
relative to the enumerated examples used in Heller. 
However, even if 922(a)(9) and 922(b)(3) are deemed to be longstanding, which I 
think it is safe to assume they are, and thus, presumptively constitutional, the presump-
tion is rebuttable. To rebut this presumption, a plaintiff has to merely show that the 
challenged law has more than a de minimis effect upon his/her Second Amendment 
right.119 Thus, the inquiry does not end here, and I will examine the effect 922(a)(9) and 
922(b)(3) have on nonresident U.S. citizens in the next section. 
113  See idem. at p. 626-27. 
114  Idem. 
115  See Dearth v. Lynch, 791 F.3d at p. 32; 42-43 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
116  See Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1244; 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
117  D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 570; 626-27 (2008).
118  See Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d at p. 185; 
196-97 (5th Cir. 2012).
119  See Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1253.
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6.2. The Statutes effect on non-resident U.S. citizens’ Second Amend-
ment rights
This inquiry raises the somewhat difficult question of what rights are guaran-
teed by the Second Amendment. As detailed in a prior section, the Heller case analyzed 
this issue. Heller ultimately held that the fundamental right of the Second Amendment 
is the right for the people to bear arms for self-defense within their homes.120 However, 
the Court did not specify how far the right to bear arms for self-defense purposes ex-
tended outside the home. The Heller court clearly ruled that the Second Amendment 
is not unlimited in its scope.121 Meaning, the fundamental right of self-defense with 
a firearm does not extend to every place or every situation. However, there is a huge 
spectrum between the fundamental right of the Second Amendment being limited to 
an individuals’ home and the fundamental right not being extended to everywhere. 
This gray area where the right to legally bear arms applies is important to the 
outcome to the case at hand. In order for the Court to rule that these statutes do not 
violate nonresident U.S. citizen’s Second Amendment Rights to legally bear arms, the 
court has to infer at least one of three things. Either the court is inferring that the right 
to legally bear arms does not extend outside the home, the prohibition of the sales for 
firearms is not the same as eliminating the right to bear arms, or that nonresident U.S. 
citizens simply lose their second amendment rights when they choose to live abroad.
Starting with the first inference that the fundamental right to legally bear arms 
for self-defense does not extend outside the home, if we assume for the sake of argu-
ment that nonresident U.S. citizens are not in their “home” when they are in the United 
States, which is debatable, and that the court does not infer either of the other two in-
ference specified above, then the Court must infer that the fundamental right to legally 
bear arms is limited only to the individual’s house. The reason is that the only difference 
between a resident U.S. citizen being anywhere in the U.S. and a non-resident U.S. citi-
zen being in the U.S. is the fact that a resident U.S. citizen has a “home” in the country in 
which he/she can exercise his/her right to legally bear arms.  If a nonresident U.S. citizen 
cannot legally purchase a gun for self-defense while he/she is in the United States, then 
he/she cannot exercise their right to self-defense with a firearm anywhere. Thus, the 
Court would have to be inferring that the fundamental right to legally bear arms does 
not extend outside an individual’s home.
The second inference the court may draw is the prohibition of the sales for fire-
arms to nonresident U.S. citizens is not the same as eliminating the right for nonresi-
dent U.S. citizens to bear arms. In Heller, the court struck down Washington’s ban on the 
120  See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 570; 628-29 (2008).
121  See idem. at p. 559. 
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possession of usable handguns both inside and outside the house.122 That is different 
than making it illegal to purchase handguns, like 922(a)(9) and 922(b)(3) do for nonresi-
dent U.S. citizens.123 Thus, the court may draw this distinction to justify 922(a)(9) and 
922(b)(3) as being constitutional, while still maintaining that nonresident U.S. citizens 
have Second Amendment rights and the fundamental right of the Second Amendment 
to legally bear arms may extend outside the home.  
The third and least persuasive inference is that nonresident U.S. citizens simply 
lose their second amendment rights when they choose to live abroad. For the court to 
uphold 922(a)(9) and 922(b)(3) as constitutional, while maintaining that the fundamen-
tal right of the Second Amendment to legally bear arms may extend outside the house 
and the prohibition of the sales for firearms to nonresident U.S. citizens is not the same 
as eliminating the right for nonresident U.S. citizens to bear arms, then the Court must 
be drawing a distinction between nonresident U.S. citizens and resident U.S. citizens. 
The distinction being that resident U.S. citizens have Second Amendment protections, 
while nonresident U.S. citizens do not have those same protections.  
All of these inferences appear untenable, and the Court should rule that the 
combined power of the statutes in question at least have more than a de minimis ef-
fect upon non-resident U.S. citizen’s Second Amendment rights. To prohibit a class of 
citizens from purchasing firearms for self-defense purposes clearly is an infringement 
upon their Second Amendment right. The Heller Court adopted an individual right 
model interpretation of the Second Amendment by holding that the Second Amend-
ment protected the fundamental right of individuals’ to bear arms for self-defense.124 
Granted, the Court qualified its holding by ruling the fundamental right was within an 
individual’s home. However, this was the fundamental right of the Second Amendment, 
which will have more of an effect on what level of scrutiny is applied.125 In light of the 
Supreme Court moving towards an individual rights model interpretation of the Sec-
ond Amendment in Heller, it would be pretty radical for the D.C. Circuit to rule that the 
statutes in question do not have more than a de minimis effect upon nonresident U.S. 
citizen’s Second Amendment rights. Thus, the court should find that the first part of the 
two part test is satisfied. 
122  See idem. at p. 635.
123  See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(9); 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3).
124  See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 570; 628-29 (2008): “Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have 
applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation 
to keep and use for protection of one’s home and family would fail constitutional muster.”
125  See Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1244; 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d at p. 
673; 682 (4th Cir. 2010).
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6.3. Applying the Proper Scrutiny 
The second part of the two step approach, i.e., what type of scrutiny will apply, 
is where the case will be won or lost. These statutes have been challenged many times 
in the past on different grounds, and when the court has applied intermediate scrutiny, 
the court has upheld the statutes as constitutional.126 Thus, it appears the plaintiff’s 
greatest and potentially only chance of success is to convince the court to apply strict 
scrutiny in this case. 
Whether the Court will choose to apply strict scrutiny or intermediate scruti-
ny will come down to the classification of what type of Second Amendment right the 
statutes are infringing upon. If the court finds that the statutes violate the plaintiff’s 
fundamental right protected by the Second Amendment, then the court will almost 
certainly apply strict scrutiny.127 Contrarily, if the court finds that the statutes violate 
the plaintiff’s non-fundamental Second Amendment rights protected by the Second 
Amendment, then the court will most likely apply intermediate scrutiny.
The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental Second Amend-
ment rights will hinge on the definition of “home.” In Heller, the court only held that the 
fundamental right protected by the Second Amendment is the right for citizens to use 
firearms for self-defense within their homes.128 The court did not rule out the possibil-
ity that the fundamental right may extend outside the home in certain circumstances, 
but it did rule out the possibility that the fundamental right extended everywhere un-
der any circumstances.129 Thus, unless this case or another Second Amendment case 
is eventually granted cert for the Supreme Court to decide whether and how far the 
fundamental right of the Second Amendment extends, the D.C. Circuit will either have 
to rule on whether this statute violates the fundamental right expressed in Heller, i.e. 
self-defense with a firearm in the home, or make a landmark ruling that the fundamen-
tal right does in fact extend outside the home to some degree. 
Consequently, the plaintiff’s in this case should be making two main arguments 
for why strict scrutiny applies. The primary argument should be that the nonresident 
U.S. citizens are in their “home” while they are in the U.S. for a period of time. The sec-
ondary argument plaintiffs should make is that the fundamental right to bear arms for 
self-defense extends to some degree outside of an individual’s home. 
126  See, e.g., United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 161 (2d Cir.2012): “transportation of firearm from another 
State into one's State of residence under section 922(a)(3)”.
127  See Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p. 1244; 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d at p. 
673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010).
128  See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 570; 628-29 (2008)
129  See idem. at p. 595: “The Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course 
the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not. Thus, we do not read 
the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we 
do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”
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Starting with the primary argument, if the plaintiff can establish that nonresi-
dent U.S. citizens are in their “home” while in the U.S., then the statutes will clearly vio-
late the fundamental right protected by the Second Amendment. However, the gov-
ernment will advance the counter argument that nonresidents are, by definition, not 
in their home while visiting the U.S.130 The best strategy for the plaintiff to combat this 
counterargument is by advancing a policy argument for why nonresident U.S. citizens 
are at “home” while in the U.S.
The policy argument for why nonresident U.S. citizens are at home while in the 
U.S. should focus on how Justice Scalia justified that the Second Amendment protects 
the fundamental right that people are entitled to bear arms for self-defense in their 
homes. Scalia wrote “the prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need 
for defense of self, family, and property is most acute… banning from the home the 
most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for the protection of one’s home 
and family would fail constitutional muster.”131 Now, as much as the government may 
make semantic arguments that a nonresident U.S. citizen is, by definition, not in his/
her home while he/she is in the United States, it is undeniable that wherever the non-
resident is staying in the United States that the same concerns apply to them. That is, 
the place they are staying will contain their self, potentially their family members, and 
definitely their property for the time they are in the United States. Thus, if the plaintiff 
can persuade the court that the place where nonresidents are staying in the U.S. is for 
all intents and purposes their “home,” then the statutes will be in clear violation of the 
fundamental right protected by the Second Amendment and subject to strict scrutiny.
Turning to the secondary argument, if the plaintiff can establish that the funda-
mental right to bear arms for self-defense extends to some degree outside of an indi-
vidual’s home, then the court can reasonably hold that the statutes violate the funda-
mental right protected by the Second Amendment. The plaintiff can draw an analogy 
between an individual’s home and other private areas that demand the same type of 
protection, e.g., a car, place of business, and hotel rooms. However, the government 
will have a strong counter argument. The government can argue that Heller’s holding 
was restricted to the “home” of individuals, and that the circuit court is not in the posi-
tion to extend the Supreme Court’s holding without direction from the Supreme Court 
itself.132 
Ultimately, the choice to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny is very important to 
this case, if not dispositive. The facts, issues, and law present the attorneys on both side 
with room to advocate for their respective positions. Based on prior cases challenging 
130  See at Fruling 2010-6 at p. 1.
131  See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. at p. 570; 626-27 (2008).
132  See Dearth v. Lynch, 791 F.3d at p. 32; 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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the law and the dissenting opinion in Dearth v. Lynch, it seems to be a safer prediction 
that the circuit court will ultimately side with the government and choose intermediate 
scrutiny. However, as mentioned above, this case presents strong arguments for the 
plaintiff’s position as well, which may convince the circuit court otherwise, or poten-
tially the Supreme Court if cert is granted.
6.3.1. Constitutionality under Intermediate Scrutiny
As stated in the prior section, if the court were to apply intermediate scrutiny, 
then the court will most likely uphold the statutes as constitutional. The statutes un-
doubtedly serve the compelling government interest of crime prevention.133 Also, in 
the absence of the statutes it appears that the government’s interest would be less 
effectively achieved. However, the third prong of the intermediate scrutiny test, i.e., 
whether the means chosen are substantially broader than necessary to achieve that 
interest, is vulnerable to attack by the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff can make a legitimate argument that the flat ban on nonresident U.S. 
citizens purchasing guns is broader than necessary. Plaintiffs can argue that a better 
means for advancing this could be something similar to how nonresidents are allowed 
to vote in federal elections, which was discussed above.134 For instance, nonresident 
U.S. citizens could be allowed to purchase weapons in the state that they resided in 
immediately prior to leaving the U.S. to reside abroad. This will solve the concern of cir-
cumventing state gun regulations because the nonresident will still be subjected to the 
state gun regulations of the state in which they resided in lastly. However, the govern-
ment will likely counter this argument by pointing out that the nonresident U.S. citizens 
are legally allowed to bring guns into the U.S. while they visit the U.S., even though they 
are prohibited from purchasing guns in the U.S.135 
6.3.2. Constitutionality under Strict Scrutiny 
If the court were to apply strict scrutiny, then the court will most likely strike 
down the statutes as unconstitutional. Strict scrutiny is in virtually all cases a death 
sentence for challenged laws because the burden is so high on the government. The 
government must demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
133  See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at p. 781; 782-83 (1989); Dearth v. Lynch, 791 F.3d at p. 32; 44 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015); Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d at p.1244, 1258.
134  See 52 U.S.C. § 20310(5)(B).
135  See Dearth v. Lynch, 791 F.3d at p. 32; 47-49 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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government interest.136 Thus, if a less restrictive alternative would advance the govern-
ment’s interest, then the legislature must use the less restrictive alternative.137 
If the case reaches the point where the court is scrutinizing the statues strictly, 
the plaintiffs should have no problem coming up with a less restrictive alternative to 
the flat out ban on nonresident U.S. citizens purchasing weapons for self-defense. For 
instance, the plaintiffs could suggest a different form for nonresident U.S. citizens to fill 
out, or an exception to the statutes for nonresident U.S. citizens.
7. CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, constitutionally guaranteed freedoms are without limit, but that 
limit is confined by a higher level of scrutiny, if not the highest scrutiny. The regulations 
in question, though dealing with the valid concern of firearms travelling from state to 
state, the incidental result is to take away the right of otherwise law-abiding citizens, not 
because they may travel to another state, but because they do not have the residency 
qualifications of the statute. Stemming organized crime, mass shootings, domestic ter-
rorism, and international terrorism is undoubtedly a compelling state interest, but this 
law would fall for being overbroad if subjected to strict scrutiny. As Dearth rises through 
the federal system, it deserves a grant of cert by the United States Supreme Court. If one 
right can be infringed, solely for the choice to live outside the country, then what other 
rights can be taken away for the same reason? Can speech critical of US foreign policy 
be criminalized, simply for it being made on the streets of Paris? Does due process stop 
at customs? These are the perils of the overly broad wording of the statutes. Jurispru-
dence is needed for an answer. 
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